Certain undesirable features are identified in the 'Structural proven signer ordering' multisignature scheme of Kotzanikolaou, Burmester and Chrissikopoulos. This scheme is a modification of a previous multisignature scheme due to Mitomi and Miyaji.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a multisignature scheme was introduced nearly 20 years ago [Itakura and Nakamura, 1983] , and a number of schemes have been proposed since that time. The fundamental idea of a multisignature scheme is that it enables a number of users to collectively create a digital signature on a document (using their own private keys). Typically, all users will sign the same document, and either the order in which they sign will be fixed or, if it is not fixed, then the verifier will not be able to determine in which order the various users signed the document.
For further details on such multisignature techniques, and also on the EIGamal signature scheme on which the cryptosystems described in this paper are based, see, for example, [Menezes et al., 1997] . ' The work reported in this paper has formed part of the Software Based Systems work &rea
Mitomi-Miyaji multisignatures
Recent papers Miyaji, 2000, Mitomi and Miyaji, 2001 ] extend the notion of a multisignature. They provide a model for a multisignature scheme that allows three key properties:
• message flexibility, i.e., each party can sign a different document,
• order flexibility, i.e., the order in which the various parties create their contribution to the multisignature is not fixed, and
• order verifiability, i.e., the order in which the various parties created their contribution to the multisignature can be verified by the verifier of the multisignature.
Mitomi and Miyaji also propose two different multisignature schemes fitting this model, one discrete logarithm based and the other RSA based.
Multisignatures for mobile agents
In [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] , the application of Mitomi-Miyaji multisignatures to a mobile agent environment is considered. Specifically, mobile agents (essentially autonomous pieces of code) may visit a number of host platforms, and may wish to collectively sign a message, e.g. to commit to a transaction on behalf of the original sponsor of the agents. Each agent will be equipped with its own (multi)signature private key.
The reason to employ such a model is that single agents may not be trusted to complete a transaction on behalf of a remote sponsor, since their operation may be interfered with by the platform on which they run. In general, there are a number of ways in which the threat posed by a small number of malicious platforms can be reduced. One such approach is to send multiple copies of a transaction agent to a number of platforms, and require that a certain number of copies of the agent (running on different platforms) all consent before the transaction is completed. Each copy of the agent is equipped with a distinct signature key pair (thus preventing an agent on one platform masquerading as an agent executing on a different platform). Of course such an approach requires some co-ordination amongst the various platforms involved, but this is not an issue we consider further here.
A variant of the above approach motivates the partiCUlar application of multisignatures we consider here. The model discussed in [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001 ] involves a series of agents: U1, U2 , ••• , Un each contributing to a multisignature in turn. Each agent Ui adds its own message string mi to the evolving multisignature, and thus user Ui actually contributes to a multisignature on a sequence of messages ml, m2,.' . ,mi ' We suppose that the recipient of the mUltisignature will only accept it if a minimum number of distinct agents have contributed to the signature, and that all the agent messages mi are 'consistent' in some applicationspecific way.
In this context, [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001 J identify a potential problem with use of Mitomi-Miyaji multisignatures. Specifically, a malicious user can delete one or more of the most recent agent contributions from a mUltisignature (Kotzanikolaou et al. call this an exclude attack). Kotzanikolaou et al. propose two different ways of addressing this problem.
• The first approach, described in Section 3.4 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001J , is called a 'simple solution'. It requires signing agent Uj to include in message mj the identity of Uj+I, the agent which Uj selects to be the next entity to contribute to the multisignature. This clearly prevents a malicious party from 'winding back' a multisignature. No changes to the Mitomi-Miyaji schemes are required .
• The second method, described in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] , is called 'structural proven signer ordering'. This solution actually involves a minor modification to the discrete logarithm based Mitomi-Miyaji scheme. The multisignature computation performed by Uj is modified to include the value of the public key of the next party to the multisignature, namely Uj+1' This is designed to achieve the same objective as the simple solution. Unfortunately, as we describe below, it is precisely this small modification that enables the manipulation of multisignatures in certain special circumstances. The main conclusion of this paper is therefore that the 'simple solution' is probably preferable.
Specifically, in the remainder of this paper we describe two undesirable features of the structural proven signer modification to the MitomiMiyaji discrete logarithm based multisignature scheme.
Notation and assumptions
We use the notation of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001J . Specifically, we suppose that a multisignature is being computed by a series of signers U1, U2,"" Uj. The part multisignature output by user Uj consists of two sequences of values, namely the messages m1, m2, ... ,mj (where mi is chosen by Ui, 1 :::; i :::; j), and the multisignature components 81,82,' .• ,8j (where 8i is computed by Ui, 1 :::; i :::; j), together with the single value rj.
As in the scheme described in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] , we suppose that p and 9 are universally agreed domain parameters, where p is a large prime satisfying p = 2q + 1, q is also prime, and 9 (1 < 9 < p) has multiplicative order q modulo p.
A (PARTIAL) MESSAGE MANIPULATION ATTACK
Suppose a malicious user has succeeded in obtaining iq as its public key, for some integer i. Of course, in general, the malicious user will not know the private key for this public key, i.e. the malicious user will not know a value x for which g:J: modp = iq. However, this does not prevent at least a partial attack, as we now describe.
2.1
The partial attack
Suppose that a multisignature is being constructed (using the method in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] 
h(mjllIDj) . (h(mjIIIDj))-1 mod q.
This requires no special knowledge. However, the fact that Vj+! mod q = o enables Uj+! to compute the 'matching' value sj using
These new values rj and sj can now be used to replace rj and Sj in the (partial) multisignature, at the same time that mj replaces mj.
Completing the attack
Whether or not the process described above is a serious attack depends on whether or not Uj+1 is in a position to complete the modified multisignature. This depends on whether Uj+1 possesses the private key Xj+1 corresponding to the public key Yj+1 = iq. In general this appears to be difficult to arrange.
However, there is one specific case where it is possible for a malicious user to calculate the private key corresponding to a public key congruent to zero modulo q. Suppose, as is often described, the domain parameters p and 9 are selected as follows.
1 p is chosen so that q = (p -1) /2 is prime, and thus precisely q -1 of the p -1 non-zero elements modulo p, i.e. approximately 50%, will be primitive (see, for example, Section 4.6.1 of [Menezes et al., 1997] ).
2 A primitive element modulo p is chosen; call this value e.
3 9 is set equal to e 2 , guaranteeing that 9 has order q.
Suppose moreover that e = 2. This is not unlikely to be the case; heuristically we expect 2 to be primitive roughly half the time, since roughly half the non-zero elements are primitive, and 2 is typically the first value chosen in a search for a primitive element. In such a case we have 9 = 22 modp = 4.
Next observe that 2 q modp = p -1 = 2q, and hence 2 q -1 modp = q. Thus, g(q-l)/2 mod p = 2 q -1 mod p = q. That is, the private key corresponding to the public key q is simply (q -1)/2. Hence, in this special case, if the malicious user chooses his/her public key to be q, then he/she will know his/her own private key, and hence would be able to complete the forged partial multisignature. This represents a serious compromise of the security of the scheme.
Of course, if this particular special case is avoided then the partial signature cannot be completed and the 'partial attack' is simply a (probably unexploitable) questionable property of the scheme.
Finally note that there is one other way in which the above situation can arise. Suppose that, after selecting p (and hence q), 9 is found by successively examining values 2, 3, 4, and so on, until an element of order q is found. This is a reasonable approach, since small values of 9 have implementation advantages. Suppose also that 2 and 3 are primitive (and hence are not suitable) -as previously, using heuristic arguments we expect this to be true roughly 25% of the time. Then 4 will have order q and will be selected -exactly the same situation now arises.
A DESTINATION MANIPULATION ATTACK
We show how three different users can conspire to manipulate a contribution to a multisignature made by an honest user.
Suppose that a multisignature is being constructed (using the method in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] ) by a series of signers U1, U2, ... , Uj, where j > 2.
Then, using the notation of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001 ], Uj-1 will compute We now show how a collaboration of three users, namely Uj-l, Uj+l and a third user which we denote by Uj+1' can modify the multisignature contribution of user Uj to make it look as though the next user specified by Uj was Uj+1 and not Uj+1. The modifications required are as follows.
First, when computing the original values of Rj-1, rj-1 and Sj-1, user Uj-1 must choose kj-l equal to xj+1' where xj+1 is the private key of user Uj+1 (we also denote the private key of user Uj+1 by Xj+1). Hence
Second, the values Rj-b rj-1 and Sj-1 are replaced with new values rj-1 and S.1-1 computed using a new 'random value' kj_1' where k j _ 1 = XHb the private key of user Uj+1.
In addition, whilst the forgery described in Section 3 works, and contravenes the required properties of the scheme, it does so in a relatively weak way (given the need for three parties to collaborate to make a small change to the victim's signature). That is, it is hard to see how this attack could be exploited to damage real users of the scheme. However, the existence of such an attack does raise serious questions about the usability of the scheme.
It would therefore appear wise to use the 'simple solution for proven signer ordering' solution, as proposed in Section 3.4 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] , as opposed to the 'structural proven signer ordering' scheme given in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] . The use ofthis former solution has the advantage that it does not change the Mitomi-Miyaji scheme, which has a proof of security, and it is also applicable to any appropriate multisignature scheme.
